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Abstract
Brahmaputra river basin is one of the most vulnerable areas in the world subject to combined
effects of glacier melt, extreme monsoon rainfall and sea level rise. Water is emerging as a
new possible irritant between China and India. For India, Water of Brahmaputra constitutes
a major lifeline for people of Tibet and North Eastern states. The building of dams and
diversion projects in Tibet by China is a matter of grave concern for lower riparian states.
For China, it is having hidden inclination to create employment potentials for more than
millions of people by making Brahmaputra diversion project forward. The requirement of
fresh water as the pollution grows and population rise has forced China to have the TsangpoBrahmaputra River project. The objective of this paper is to focus the reaction of both people
on the water diversion issue, disastrous ecological consequences and the urgent necessity for
having a water treaty between Asian giants. It also examines the hegemonic tendencies of
China on Brahmaputra River & exercise of power for economic gains and outcomes. The
policies China takes on trans- Boundary Rivers are not symptom of peaceful nature of its
rise. In addition, it establishes the fact that sharing of information, ecosystem-friendly
policies, thought and mutual understanding will dispel the suspicion and develop trust
between two countries, creating an enabling environment for better management of
Brahmaputra River.
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Introduction
The Brahmaputra is a trans-boundary river and one of the major rivers of Asia, originated in
the Angsi Glacier, located on the northern side of the Himalayas in Burang County of Tibet
as the YarlungTsangpo River. It flows across southern Tibet to break through the Himalayas
in great gorges (including the YarlungTsangpo Grand Canyon) and into Arunachal Pradesh
(India) where it is known as Dihang or Siang. It flows southwest through the Assam Valley
as Brahmaputra and south through Bangladesh as the Jamuna. In the vast Ganges Delta it
merges with the Padma, the main distributary of the Ganges, then the Meghna, before
emptying into the Bay of Bengal (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brahmaputra_River,
2013).The river drains the Himalaya east of the Indo-Nepal border, southern-central portion
of the Tibetan plateau above the Ganges basin, south-eastern portion of Tibet, the PatkaiBum hills, the northern slopes of the Meghalaya hills, the Assam plains and the northern
portion of Bangladesh. The basin, especially south of Tibet is characterized by high levels of
rainfall. Kangchenjunga (8,586m) is the only peak above 8,000m and the highest point within
the Brahmaputra basin (See Map-1).
Map: 1-Major Rivers in India

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Major_Rivers_in_India.jpg

About 1,800 miles (2,900 km) long, the Brahmaputra is an important river for irrigation and
transportation. The average depth of the river is 124 feet (38 m) and maximum depth is 380
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feet (120 m). The river is prone to catastrophic flooding in spring when the Himalayan snows
melt. The average discharge of the river is about 19,300 cubic metres per second (680,000 cu
ft/s), and floods can reach over 100,000 cubic metres per second (3,500,000 cu ft/s). It is also
one of the few rivers in the world that exhibit a tidal bore. It is navigable for most of its
length. The Brahmaputra's upper course was long unknown, and its identity with the Yarlung
Tsangpo was only established by exploration in 1884–86. This river is often called TsangpoBrahmaputra River. The lower reaches are sacred to Hindus. While most rivers on the Indian
subcontinent have female names, this river has a rare male name, as it means "son of
Brahma" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brahmaputra_River2013).

The key challenge for sustainable management of the basin is conflict over water between
two Asian giants. Conflict is frightening over sustained growth in water and energy demand,
interference with natural river flows from dams, inter-basin water transfers and water
diversions. The basin is characterized by large seasonal fluctuation in water availability due
to

the

very

wet

monsoon

and

the

extremely

dry

winter

(http://www.saciwaters.org/brahmaputra-dialogue/index.html). The curious amalgam of
burgeoning populations, rapid economic growth, and intensified global competition for
energy resources is driving China and India to put growing emphasis on hydropower. The
planned hydropower and water diversion projects, combined with mounting water security
concerns have a greater impact on relations between these two countries.

Potential Factors for China’s Water Diversion
The idea of diverting the water of Brahmaputra was first mentioned in the International
Conference of Global Infrastructure Fund in Anchorage, Alaska, in 1986. In 2005, the
publication of the book “Tibet‟s waters will save China” brought this issue to the limelight by
(Li 2005). Prior to this, the people‟s daily in 2003 reported the launch of a feasibility study on
diverting the Brahmaputra (Hughes 2013). China is insecure in water, meaning thereby
uneven distribution of waters within its territory. To realize the goal of setting up a massive
South North water diversion project, China had made a confrontational attempt by diverting
the water of the river that has caused the deterioration in the harmonious relation since 1962.
The incredible growth of Chinese population and rapid urbanization has aggravated the
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greatest concerns of the country .Current data show that China has only 7 per cent of world‟s
fresh water to meet the needs of 22 per cent world‟s people. Again, the country‟s water
resources are not equally spread. Southern China, with roughly 700 million people, has 4/5 of
its water and Northern China, with 550 million people, has 1/5th of the water. The decreased
water flow and the environmental impact together have impacted the irrigation practices and
local livelihoods further compounding the intensity of the problem. The gradual melting of
Himalayan glacier as a result of accelerating climate change, drying up the Brahmaputra river
have palpable impact upon human health, water availability and rise in water-borne diseases.

China has serious requirement to supply water to its North-West territory, the Gobi desert,
which holds almost half the country‟s total land mass. China has only 7 per cent of its fresh
water. The Gobi exists over an area of 1,300,000 Sq KM making it one of the largest deserts
in the world. Desertification of Gobi since 1950 has expanded it by 52,000 sq km and it is
now just 160k.m from Beijing. The Brahmaputra flows through some of the most heavily
disputed and unstable areas in South Asia. China and India currently dispute 83,000 K.M
within the basin. Alluvial or “Char” land that is exposed as a river shifts often leads to
dispute, as the land is highly valued for agriculture (CIA 1998 and IBRU 1999). Both China
and India are water-stressed economies. The spread of irrigated farming and water intensive
industries have led to severe struggle for more water. Both are in the era of perennial water
scarcity. A large population, water shortages, ineffective water sharing and rising demands of
middle class call for a stable source of water supply between two nations. Melting glaciers
badly affect rivers originating in the Tibetan Plateau which leads to tension. In order to
overcome hydrological unevenness, projects like the “South to North water diversion” was
first proposed by chairman Mao in 1952 to reduce water shortages in the cities like Beijing &
Tianjin. Later on faced with acute water shortage, China proposed for water diversion
projects namely- the South-North Water Diversion Project and the Great Western Route
Diversion Project. There are two components behind the planning of Yarlung projects. (i) to
generate hydro Power (ii) To reroute the Brahmaputra‟s water to the dry yellow river in the
North Western provinces of Xinjiang and Gansu.

Tibet is the source of major Indian rivers. It is the world‟s largest fresh water repository after
the polar ice caps. The Tibetan Plateau serves as common source of water resources for
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upstream dams, barrages and canal (Chellaney 2009).The Tibetan Plateau is the principal
Asian watershed and source of ten major rivers. Four of the world ten rivers the Brahmaputra,
Indus, Yangtze and Mekong have their head water on Tibetan Plateau. China‟s intensive
farming needs water. Now China is emphasizing upon massive inter-basin and inter-river
water transfer projects. China wants to re-route Brahmaputra water northward before the river
enters India. The Brahmaputra is also the source of freshwater for China. The increased
demand of fresh water has prompted the construction of dams and barrages by way of
artificial structures (Rashid 2013). . China foremost desire is to reduce its reliance on fossil
fuels. To meet future demand for energy, China aims to double its electricity generating
capacity from 960 gigawatts in 2010 to 1,900 GW in 2020. Huge hydroelectricity projects for
energy & water diversion schemes for food sufficiency are strategic to China‟s growth path
(Sinha 2012). The high dependence on coal has also given the dubious distinction of being
world‟s top emitter of green house gases. This factor necessitated to rethink on the “Scientific
Development Concept” for a balanced and sustainable development. China‟s new energy
policy then emphasized upon hydro and nuclear power.

The extraction of Tibet‟s untapped natural resources are supposed to fuel the economic
engines of eastern China which will make backward Tibet forward, ensuring economic
integration and stability. Developing hydro-power resources helps China to reduce the
income gap between China‟s eastern provinces and its western regions. Selling electricity to
its neighbours promotes cross border integration, which benefits the western China
development programme. Apart from it, energy is key for tapping significant reserves of
uranium, borax, chromite, Lithium, copper, zinc, iron etc in the TAR (Tibet Autonomous
Region).

Indian Concerns
Water is the lifeline for more than one billion people living down stream. The diversion of
water heavily causes environmental devastation of India‟s north eastern plains. North India
would be starved of its lifeline. China has used water as a political weapon against India. The
Chinese projects constitute an imminent threat to India‟s water security. The management of
water through river projects was not water storage, but deadly flash floods. Nutrient-rich
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sediments that enrich the soil of these regions would be held back in the reservoir instead of
reaching the river‟s delta. A water war could ensue (Arpi 2003) China is a country which is
not interested in addressing the water issue faced by India. It thinks that it is not a problem at
all. It hardly considers the ecology and economic future of North-Eastern states of India.
China‟s discrete water utilization and water committal approaches are equally provocative.
China‟s thirst for water is so intense that it will leave other lower riparian states thirsty,
according to analysts (Sinha 2012).

People of North east were depending on its water for agriculture. Now by this project, Indian
farming became vulnerable along with frequent environmental hazards. Reduction in water
discharge of Brahmaputra has added to the problems of poverty, migration, violence and
social instability. It could give more strategic leverage to China than India. An officially
blessed book published in 2005, Tibet’s Water will save China (2005) openly championed the
north ward re-routing of the Brahmaputra (Chellaney 2009). India has been reeling under the
perennial fear of China. If water is stored in the upper stream by China, there will be less
water flowing, causing negative effects on water use for its industrial and agricultural sectors.
In respect of control of allocations of water means, China will exert substantial economic
influence upon the rising South Asian power. If it draws off water in the reservoirs on the
YarlungZangbo River, it wills swampland. India contents that China will probably carryout
interceptions during dry seasons and discharges during rainy season as means to impose
pressure on Indian government. India will remain at the mercy of upper riparian China.

Beijing gave no notice to the Indian Government in building the $ 1.2 billion Zangmu dam on
Brahmaputra. China always chooses to remain secretive on diversion issue. If China
continues in constructing dams in the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra, it would surely
affect the downstream areas in North-East India. The depletion of water resources would
cause an adverse impact in the agriculture, fishing and in total the economy of the region. If
China goes building projects on Brahmaputra River, it will not only affect its neighbours, but
also a regional instability in South Asia and water crisis. Lack of transparency and lack of
water sharing treaties are major concerns for India. The silent water war can become a reality.
China‟s expertise & knowledge of dam building facilitates to widen its power & influence &
weakens lower riparian coalitions.
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China disturbs the statuesque in international water flows by way of construction of megadams, causing serious implications for South-Westerly neighbour. It has erected more dams
than the rest of the world combined. The construction of dams is ecologically unsafe with
serious and disastrous consequences (Li 2005 and Chellaney 2011). China is the world‟s most
prolific builders of hydropower dams and is the source of 10 major rivers flowing to 11
countries. The conflict over water resources may escalate the situation into potential
intensified controversy. China is a country which adopts unilateral approach in the
construction of dams without consulting other countries about how a new dam may affect
them. It does not address its neighbour‟s concerns. The China‟s neighbours have water
agreements among themselves, but no one has made any water treaty with China (Chellaney
2011). China does not consult any co-riparian state before starting any geopolitical
progression. It fails to understand the nuances of downstream affects on the lower riparian
countries by hydro-projects on upper reaches of river. It denies adopting any bilateral
mechanism show casing its self interests in water course. It uses water as a political tool to
attain the unrivalled water hegemony in the region. India‟s high-levelled edginess stems from
China‟s opaque position. China treats water as an essential strategic commodity by building
engineered hydro-projects (Hukil 2013).

China is driven by energy thirst. China is the largest industrial water consumer with 120
billion cubic meters a year. Water is becoming an aspiration for prosperity. Beijing
continuous interest for establishing its leadership in water domain has exacerbated the
fractious and uneasy relationship to a more potential form. China is seen as a water
hegemonic power. Sharing of the trans-boundary water resources is a huge challenge to the
harmonious Sino- Indian relations. The construction of dams is a calculated strategy by China
to exert control over its resources at the expenses of other riparian countries. China tries to
treat water for ensuring sustained economic growth, political and social stability. Unilateral
Chinese harnessing of resources causes a political discord between two Asian giants and
water has become a potential source of enduring discord. China does not have a single water
treaty with any co-riparian country. It rejects the very concept of water sharing. It sets up
water diversion structures in its borderlands, spurring unease and concern in downriver
countries. China is now confronting diplomatic challenges in a region where it had worked to
project an image of benevolence and brotherhood. China is always opaque in its hydroengineering plans, refusing to share information. Water has become an apple of discord and a
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security issue in Sino- Indian relations. The Indians government has frequently been insisting
China to share hydrological information, transparency and not to redirect the natural flow of
water, but it has proved of little value (Chellaney 2009). China plan is to acquire great power
leverage over India, worsening the tension between two Asian giants (Gordon 2009).

Chinese Concerns
According to the Chinese, the Indians protest China in the case of building dam projects on
the Brahmaputra to gain sympathy and support from the international community. The
Chinese development projects do not impede the flow of river. India prevents China from
developing Tibetan water resources (Zhifei 2013). The security fears of India are exaggerated
propaganda. China also wants to share its water, hydroelectricity with its neighbours. The
construction of dams are meant for downstream countries also as they will be benefitted out
of it. In order to bolster its control over the disputed Arunachal Pradesh, India is building
reservoirs on the Brahmaputra River. It has already set up dozens of hydro power stations to
reinforce its actual control and occupation in the disputed area (Patranobis 2013). The
Chinese scholars believe that India is greedy and water from the tributary rivers on its side of
Himalaya frontier should be adequate. India wants deliberately to make China a water
security threat .It has been asserted that Delhi has no legitimacy to demand China‟s restraint
as it used large volumes of water (Holslag 2011). China sees hydro power as a key resource
for responding to energy shortages which is an impediment to economic growth (Rosenfield
2010).

There are signs of increasing desertification of Northern China .Around 500 million people
living in northern region get access to only one fifth of total fresh water in China whereas
Southern part gets four fifth of fresh water with a population of 700 million. To set this
imbalance right, China needs to bring in sufficient water to its northern region from all
possible sources (Mishra 2010). China has assured India that it would ensure protection and
rational use of water resources in the trans-Himalayan Rivers that flow to India from the
upper reaches of Himalayas on the Chinese side. With an average elevation of about 4000
meters, the system will provide electricity and prove to be a useful mechanism in flood
control methods. China upholds the principle of “Prior Appropriation”. For China, the
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building of the dam is merely a run-of-the river water project aimed at generating power that
will not hold the water of the lower riparian states. This hydro project "is not of a big capacity
and has no need for storage of water and it will not affect the ecology and environment”. The
Chinese government always adheres to the principle of fairness, reasonableness and equal
attention to development and protection of the interests of the lower stream regions (The
Economics Times 2012).

Confidence Building Measures
In 1954, both countries signed a MoU to share hydrological data but the border war 1962
halted the progress. In 2002, A MoU was signed for five years to help in forecasting floods
caused by Brahmaputra in this North Eastern India. In accordance with the provisions of
MoU, the Chinese side provided hydrological information (Water level, discharge and
rainfall) in respect of three stations namely Nugesha, Yangcun and Nuxia located on river
Brahmaputra from the 1st June to 15th October every year through e-mail twice a day. Both
nations have not shown any interest in 1992 United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe (UNECFE). Another MoU was signed in April 2005 for supply of water flow
information in respect of Satlej in the flood season. In 2006, during Chinese president‟s visit
to India, an agreement was made for setting up an Expert-level-Mechanism (ELM) to discuss
interaction and co-operation on the provision of flood season hydrological data, emergency
management and other related issues (Raul 2013). According to recent MoU (2013) both will
exchange views on issues of mutual interest. The main concern for India is not only the
Yarlung project in Brahmaputra water, rather the China‟s effort of diverting the water to its
arid Northern areas. In October, 2013, Prime Ministers of both countries agreed to strengthen
their co-operation on the trans-border Rivers through the existing Expert level Mechanism to
provide flood season data and emergency management. Under the new agreement, the
Chinese side agreed to provide more flood data of Brahmaputra River from May to October
instead of June to October that was in practice beforehand.

~9~

Need of the Hour
Both China and India have been plagued by drought and shortage of drinkable water. The
water shortages in two countries present a large threat to food security. Both leaders of two
nations seem to recognize these new challenges. Both need to develop water sharing
agreement. China, India and Bangladesh should design a comprehensive river basin plan to
control geological disasters and impact of the hydroelectric projects. The impact of
ecosystem tipping points is also highly devastating beyond our current knowledge. Keeping
this thing in view, adaption strategies and adaption action plans need to undertaken
collectively. An integrated dialogue is called for managing & reducing disaster along with the
use of technology & resources. The security forces of both countries should be deployed in
the border areas for the early reporting of any serious ecological changes found in the region.
There is a greater necessity for undertaking collaborative scientific studies on glacier melting
& its effects on the flow of river (Gautam 2012).

There is a necessity to redefine Tibetan water sources as a „commons‟ that would draw
international attention & encourage China to get into a water dialogue with downstream
countries. India needs to put forward a strong case to China, based on the ecological, cultural
and livelihood sustenance, the river provides the lacs of people down-stream (IDSA 2010). It
is equally important for India to frame policies that are not reactive but perceptive. It is need
of hour for India to present the issue multilaterally by involving Bangladesh, not bilaterally.
India should leave no stone unturned to draw China into a water dialogue diplomatically
(Sinha 2012). There is a need to set up mutual scientific and technological partnerships to
optimize water efficiency, environmental protection and conservation strategies. As the
international laws are weak in the governance of water, the best way for India to manage
hydro-politics with China is through co-operative approach and institutional mechanism.
Utilizing water resources in collaboration with neighbours may indeed promote win-win
solutions. A joint hydroelectric dam can be shared benefits to all lower riparian states and
upper riparian states. Cooperation can be driven by benefits from the river and to the river
through joint multipurpose projects, improving the management of water resources,
monitoring changes in glaciers, coping with floods and strengthening natural disaster
management. Emphasizing options for co-operation at various levels may broaden the basket
of potential benefits to both upstream and downstream countries (Svensson2012).
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To moderate competition and build value-based co-operation, institutional mechanisms are
most essential at bilateral or basin-wide level as there is no international treaty presently in
effect. There are no practical enforcement mechanisms internationally available to prevent
any country from materially altering cross border flows of a transnational water course
through dam building. That is why it is important to build co-operation on the basis of jointly
agreed rules. Inter country water institutions based on the international norms of fair
utilization would help in facilitating constructing dialogue and structured co-operation.
Although such co-operation is a daunting task, still such collaboration is necessary for
maintaining the sustainability of basin resources, strategic stability and environmental
protection (Chellaney 2012). Such co-operation needs to be based on transparency,
information sharing, dispute settlement mechanisms and a mutual commitment to refrain
from projects diminishing water flows.

Conclusion
Water conflict is a Sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of Asian giants. Something
has to be done before the catastrophe of conflict clasps the beautiful creation. Efforts should
be continued to douse the conflict before it takes intense form. The governments of both
countries should try their best to check protests over the construction by the people, creating
sufficient awareness camps (Hussain Undated).A large population needs for national water
resources and ineffective water sharing policies have triggered up the potential conflict
between two Asian neighbours. The leaders of both countries have identified the importance
of water security. Water should become a source of co-operation, not of conflict. It is time to
have a water treaty between Asian giants based on sharing of information, thought, mutual
understanding that will dispel the suspicion and develop trust and entente between the two
countries. Diplomatic channels and bilateral arrangements will serve the purpose in the due
course. In case, the negotiations for amicable settlement falls flat, the issue should be raised
at UN Security Council as the lives of millions of people are in danger. The 2010 SFG report
had suggested for the formation of a Himalayan Rivers Commission to create a peaceful and
multilateral approach to tackling overall water shortage. But India, China and their
neighbours are yet to agree on a coordinated approach so far. There is neither bilateral
agreement on water sharing nor any supervening international law to regulate such activity.
In this situation, both nations are required to discuss the issue in order to reach a satisfactory
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agreement. The need for consultation and accord on specific projects has become more
important on water sharing.
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